Rule 10b-5:The Disclosure of Finder\u27s Fees in Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Securities by Cocanower, David L.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 6
Summer 1969
Rule 10b-5:The Disclosure of Finder's Fees in
Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Securities
David L. Cocanower
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cocanower, David L. (1969) "Rule 10b-5:The Disclosure of Finder's Fees in Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Securities,"
Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 44 : Iss. 4 , Article 6.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol44/iss4/6
RULE 10b - 5: THE DISCLOSURE OF FINDER'S FEES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE OR SALE OF SECURITIES
In SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc.,' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district court's denial of a
preliminary injunction for alleged violations of the Securities Exchange
Act (SEA) disclosure provisions.2 The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) alleged Great American Industries, Inc. (GAI) had
issued press releases and filed 8-K reports3 which contained untrue
statements of material facts or omitted material information necessary to
prevent the statements made from being misleading, in violation of rule
10b-54 as to the press releases and rule 13a-1l as to the 8-K reports.5
1. SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., -F.2d-(2d Cir. 1968), 37 U.S.L.W. 238 (Jan.
7, 1969), CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,325 (hereinafter cited as GAI) rev'g 259 F. Supp.
99 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1969)
(Nos. 1185, 1186, & 1195).
2. The Securities Act of 1933 (SA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (1964), the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1964), and the rules promulgated
thereunder, attempt to control fraudulent schemes, misstatements or nondisclosures, and
business practices in a variety of ways. [Hereinafter all citations will be to the relevant
sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and to 17 C.F.R. § 240.] The 1933 Act prohibits
fraudulent schemes and courses of business in section 17(a) and imposes liability for
misrepresentations of material facts in sections 11(a) and 12(2). The 1934 Act
regulates all three types of fraudulent practices in section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, and
fraudulent courses of business in section 15(a) (1) and rule 15cl-2. The various provisions
differ as to the acts and persons regulated, the jurisdictional means involved, and the
available sanctions. For a helpful tabular comparison of the five provisions, see A.
BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW: FRAUD: SEC RULE 1OB-5 16-17 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as BROMBERG].
3. Rule 13a-11 provides that companies subject to the jurisdiction of the SEA must
file 8-K reports for those months in which one or more of the events enumerated in the
8-K report have occurred. The enumerated events include transactions in securities
exceeding five per cent of the amount of securities of the class outstanding prior to
the transactions; material changes in shareholder rights or the underlying security of
registered securities; material defaults upon the senior securities; changes in the control
of the company; material revaluation of assets or- restatement of the capital share
account; submission of matters to a vote of security holders; material extraordinary
legal proceedings; and acquisition or disposition of a significant amount of assets. CHH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 31,003. The present case involved disclosure of this latter item.
4. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of a national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Rule 10b-5 was originally intended to apply to fraud by purchasers since such fraud
was left unregulated by other disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws. See
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Secondly, the SEC alleged that GAI and three of its officers,' in violation
of rule 10b-5 and rule 13a-11, had failed to disclose the material fact that
substantial finder's fees were to be paid in connection with the acquisition
note 2 supra. However, its coverage has been expanded to allow purchasers recovery
against fraudulent sellers as well. E.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
See Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications
of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1276 (1965). The purposes
underlying rule 10b-5 have been interpreted variously as equalization of bargaining
positions in securities transactions, disclosure of material facts, regulation of action by
corporate insiders dealing with their own stock, insurance of adequate market informa-
tion, and codification of notions of fundamental fairness in securities transactions.
BROMBERG 265-77.
The general anti-fraud provisions of rule 10b-5 overlap other provisions of the SEA;
e.g., the regulatory scheme covering proxy solicitations under section 14. J.I. Case v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). "The fact that there may well be some overlap is neither
unusual nor unfortunate." SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 89 S. Ct. 564, 573 (1969). Thus,
conduct may be violative of one or both of rules 13a-11 and l0b-5. For example, failure
to disclose acquisitions or disposition of less than "a significant amount of assets"
(see note 5 infra) would not be violative of rule 13a-11 but could, where a duty of
full disclosure exists, constitute a violation of rule lob-5. Failure to disclose transactions
which are required to be disclosed by rule 13a-11 would constitute a violation of that
provision but would not constitute a violation of rule lOb-5 if the required information
could be found to be immaterial. The third situation, a violation of both rules lob-5
and 13a-11, was present in the principal case.
Although GAI was found to have made misleading statements in its press releases
as to the consideration involved in property acquisitions, in the absence of such mis-
leading press releases the nondisclosure of material finder's fees in GAI's 8-K report
coupled with the full disclosure requirements of rule lOb-5 would suffice to impose a
duty of full disclosure on GAL.
5. For transactions concerning physical property other than a business, the 8-K
report defines a "significant amount of assets" as assets whose net book value, or the
amount paid or received therefor, exceeds fifteen per cent of the total assets of the
disclosing company and its consolidated subsidiaries. For those transactions which must
be disclosed, the information given must include "the nature and amount of consideration
given or received therefor, the principle followed in determining the amount of such
consideration, the identity of the persons from whom the assets were acquired or to
whom they were sold and the nature of any material relationship between such persons
and the registrant or any of its affiliates ... " CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 31,003 at
21,992.
The circuit court found that GAI's failure to make full disclosure in its press releases
and 8-K reports of all material facts concerning the commercial potentialities of the
various mining properties was "something more" than mere negligence which justified
granting injunctive relief. GAI at 97,539.
6. Given the complexity of the litigation and the number of parties involved, it
will be helpful to study the following playbill:
Corporations: Great American Industries, Inc. (GAI)-Principal corporate de-
fendant previously engaged in the manufacture and sale of various confections; Con-
solidated Sulphur Corporation (CSC)-Owner of California sulphur property; Basin
Mining Company (BMC)-Owner of Arizona copper property; and Pacific Sulphur
Company (PSC)-Owner of Nevada sulphur property.
Corporate Officer Defendants: Walter S. Mack-Chairman of GAI; Bernard D.
Marren-Financial vice president and a director of GAI; and Irving Stolz-General
counsel and a director of GAl.
Finder Defendants: Jerome Matusow-The finder who approached Mack concerning
the California, Arizona, and Nevada mining properties; William T. Beard-Driller and
mining engineer who apparently owned all the shares in BMC; and Frederick J.
Pagnani-Legal counsel for Matusow and Beard in the Arizona and Nevada transactions.
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of three mining properties by GAl. Finally, the SEC alleged that the
7. A "finder" has been defined as "[olne who finds, interests, introduces, and
brings together the parties for a deal which they themselves negotiate and consummate.
A more precise term for a finder is 'intermediary' or 'middleman.'" Ames v. Ideal
Cement Co., 37 Misc. 2d 883, 886, 235 N.Y.S. 2d 622, 625 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Accord,
Baldwin v. Grymes, 232 Md. 470, 194 A.2d 285(1963).Finder's fees may be paid by either
party to a transaction. Davidson v. Robie, 345 Mass. 333, 187 N.E.2d 371 (1963). As to
the amount of the fee ". .. there is no percentage fixed by custom. In the absence of any
agreement thereon, the percentage allowed to the finder depends on how much work is
done by him and what his position is in the deal .... Cray, McFawn & Co. v. Hegarty,
Conroy & Co., 27 F. Supp. 93, 97 n.1 (D.C.N.Y. 1939). The function of a finder may be
distinguished from that of a broker by the fact that the finder is employed merely to in-
troduce a purchaser to a seller, without taking part in the negotiations in consummation
of the sale. E.g., Chapman & Co. v. Cornelius, 39 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Bittner v.
American-Marietta Co., 162 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Ill. 1958) ; Kuffler v. List, 144 F. Supp.
776 (D.C.N.Y. 1956) ; Palmer v. Wahler, 133 Cal. App. 2d 705, 285 P.2d 8 (1955) ; Cro-
foot v. Spivak, 113 Cal. App. 2d 146, 248 P.2d 45 (1952) ; McKenna v. Edwards, 19 Cal.
App. 2d 327, 65 P.2d 810 (1937) ; Jackson v. New Orleans Bd. of Trade, 207 La. 571, 21
So. 2d 731 (1945); Knauss v. Gottfried Krueger Brewing Co., 142 N.Y. 70, 36 X.E.
867 (1894); contra, Carson v. Keane, 4 N.J. 221, 72 A.2d 314 (1950). Since the
distinction is functional, a licensed broker may act as a finder in a given transaction.
Lindeman v. Textron, Inc., 229 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1956).
The three separate transactions involved in the events leading up to the action in
Great American Industries were:
California transaction
GAI acquired a ninety-day option upon sulphur property, the exercise of which
would have resulted in the payment by GAI of 250,000 dollars and the issuance of
1,600,000 shares of GAI stock to CSC. CSC had made a prior agreement to distribute
600,000 or 37.5 per cent of the 1,600,000 shares as follows: Matusow 200,000; Lester
200,000; and Howard 200,000.
Ari7ona transaction
GAI acquired an option on a copper property which was exercisable by the payment
of 50,000 dollars and the issuance of 200,000 shares of GAI stock to Beard as sole
stockholder of BMC. Beard, however, had made a prior agreement to distribute 167,000
of the 200,000 shares to Matusow, Lester, Seagraves, and Pagnani. 259 F. Supp. at 106.
Nevada bransaction
April 22, 1966 contract: In return for sulphur property GAI was to pay Crofoot
Lumber Company 4,500,000 dollars in royalties and to issue 300,000 shares to be
distributed under the contract as follows: Crofoot Lumber Company 17,340; Canyon State
Mining Company 41,330; and Commonwealth Silver Company 41,330 (total thirty-three
per cent) ; Matusow, 134,000; Pagnani 33,000; and Beard 33,000 (total sixty-seven per
cent).
This contract was never closed, either due to the suspension of trading in GAI stock
on the American Stock Exchange on April 29, 1966, (GAI at 97,540) or to a lawsuit
against the sellers to enjoin the sale (GAI at 97,549), but was subsequently renegotiated
to provide for the distribution of shares as follows: Crofoot Lumber Company 44,232;
Canyon State Mining Company 105,384; and Commonwealth Silver Company 105,384
(total eighty-five per cent) ; Matusow 15,000; Pagnani 15,000; and Beard 15,000 (fifteen
per cent).
The very fact of the existence of finder's fees was itself an issue in the principal
case. In the Arizona transaction, Beard, as sole owner of BMC, had previously entered
into a joint venture agreement with Pagnani and Matusow which provided for their
sharing in mining properties owned by Beard on a basis of four-sixths to Matusow and
one-sixth each to Pagnani and Beard. GAI at 97,550.
In the Nevada transaction, Beard and Matusow brought the property to the
attention of GAL. They, along with Pagnani, asserted that the shares of stock which they
were to receive were not finder's fees at all but proceeds paid out under a joint venture
agreement between themselves whereby Matusow and Beard contributed sales services
DISCLOSURE OF FINDER'S FEES
sellers and those who acted as finders in the property transactions violated
rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose to GAI the amount of fees to be paid the
finders.
The circuit court held that the failure of GAI and its corporate
officers to disclose the division of consideration of which they were aware
rendered misleading their prior statements as to the consideration in both
their press releases and their 8-K reports.' The court also held that the
failure of the sellers and finders to respond fully to questions concerning
the division of consideration constituted common law fraud and thus
violated rule 10b-5.
The district court had denied the SEC's request for a preliminary
injunction on the grounds that the SEC had failed to establish that the
nondisclosed finder's fees were a material fact.9 Relying on the failure of
the SEC to charge that nondisclosure of the finder's fees indicated that
the property received was overvalued" or that GAI would not have
issued the stock had it known of the division between the owners and
and Pagnani his legal services. GAI at 97,552. For various views as to whether to dis-
regard the existence of these alleged joint ventures, compare 259 F. Supp. at 108 with
GAI at 97,543, 97,547, 97,550, and 97,5.2.
S. That the duty of disclosure is limited to those situations where there is knowledge
of both the existence of finders and the amount of their fees is clearly demonstrated by
the factual differences in the three transactions involved. In the California transaction,
neither GAI nor its officers knew of the existence of the finders or of the amount of
their fees. GAI at 97,539. In the Arizona transaction, the corporation and its officers
knew of the existence of the finders but not the amount of their fees. Id. In the Nevada
transaction, the corporation and its officers knew of both the existence of the finders and
the amount of their fees. GAI at 97,540. It was only in the latter transaction that the
court found a duty of disclosure.
9. SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 259 F. Supp. 99, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
10. One of the more puzzling elements of the decision is the role which the question
of valuation played. The SEC stated that "... the true value of the mining properties
in question is not an issue before this court. . . " Id. at 102. The district court stressed
the fact that valuation was not an issue: "Most important, it is not charged that the
property acquired in exchange for the shares issued was not worth the value of the
shares which were issued in payment therefore." Id.
By the time the case had reached the circuit court, however, the scent of over-
valuation grew stronger. Judge Friendly, author of the majority opinion, felt that the
undisclosed finder's fees were "so unusual as to raise legitimate question in the mind of a
prospective purchaser of GAI stock whether GAI had not been 'taken! and whether the
Nevada mine was worth anything like what GAI was paying for it." GAI at 97,540
(emphasis added). Judge Kaufman, in his concurring opinion, felt that the finders
• . . were awarded such a disproportionate percentage of the total consideration paid
for the property that, were this arrangement disclosed, it would clearly have indicated the
property could not be worth the price paid. Id. at 97,543 (emphasis added). Judge Hays,
in a concurring opinion, felt that the amount of finder's fees was a material factor to the
buyer in determining the price to be paid. Id. at 97,544. These exercises of judicial notice
outside the scope of the pleadings are severely criticized by Judge Moore in his
dissent: "[T]he majority confuse the question of value and the fairness of the purchase
price with the question of distribution of the purchase price." Id. at 97,549.
Given the intimate relation between valuation and the issue of materiality, it is clear
that interjection of the valuation question might have been dispositive of the case,
or at least highly prejudicial to the defendant's interests.
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the finders, the district court held that there was no duty of disclosure
under rule lOb-5 for any of the defendants." Granting that the trial judge
might have been within the bounds of his discretion in denying injunctive
relief for nondisclosure of the finder's fees alone, the circuit court held that
the nondisclosure of the finder's fees in conjunction with the misleading
press releases and 8-K reports warranted the issuance of an injunction
for the nondisclosure of finder's fees."1
The uncertainty of the sufficiency of nondisclosure of finder's fees
standing alone as a proper basis for the issuance of a preliminary injunc-
tion, the phenomenal amount of litigation under rule lOb-5,13 the impact
which this decision could have on buyers, sellers, and finders engaged in
transactions within the scope of rules lOb-5 and 13a-11, and the potential
application of the decision to private damage actions provide the impetus
for this comment. 4 Although the decision dealt with disclosure of other
material facts, consideration will be limited to the effect of the decision on
the disclosure of finder's fees.
I. DUTY OF DISCLOSURE
Under common law, a party to a transaction need make no factual
disclosures so long as he refrains from making any representations
whatsoever." If, however, a party elects to break his total silence, he is
then under a duty to disclose whatever additional facts are necessary to
prevent his partial disclosure from being misleading. 6 Under rule 1Ob-5
disclosure is also required in such situations. In addition, rule lOb-5
has been interpreted in certain limited circumstances as requiring affir-
mative disclosure by those having access to material inside information."
11. SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 259 F. Supp. 99, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
12. GAI at 97,541.
13. As the Supreme Court recently noted, "... section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
may well be the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws ... " SEC v.
National Sec., Inc., 89 S. Ct. 564, 571 (1969).
14. In addition, Indiana's adoption of a provision in its state securities la.w closely
patterned after rule lOb-5 renders judicial construction of the federal rule of additional
significance. See IND. ANN-. STAT. § 25-866 (Burns Supp. 1968).
15. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 101 (3d ed. 1964).
16. Id. This duty of disclosure has been applied to information received subsequent
to the partial disclosure and extends to those persons whom the party knows are acting
on the basis of the original partial disclosure. Affirmative duties of disclosure may exist
when parties are in a fiduciary relationship or when one party possesses special
knowledge unobtainable by the other party. Id. at 711-12.
17. Total silence may violate rule 10b-5 when a party has access to material inside
information not available to the investing public (SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub. nom., Coates v. SEC, 37 U.S.L.W. 3399
(U.S. April 22, 1969); see Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information
Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv.
1271, 1277-80 (1965)), or where a party utilizes his position as a controlling stockholder
to engage in fraudulent deception. Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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Underlying rule 10b-5 is a policy of protecting the investing public
from practices which produce inequality between individual investors by
requiring full disclosure of information which is not available to the
public. If this policy is to be effectuated the rule must assure that factual
representations made available to the public are accurate.' 8 Judicial
approval of these policies has been evinced by the relaxation of evidentiary
requirements and the elimination of some elements necessary for a cause
of action in common law fraud. 9
The circuit court in Great American Izdustries found partial dis-
closures by all defendants concerning the consideration which was to be
given by GAI in various transactions. Although the court avoided creat-
ing an affirmative duty of disclosure by limiting the violations to those
situations involving partial disclosure, the opinion does represent a signi-
ficant extension of a duty of disclosure to facts not previously judicially
required to be disclosed."
Rule lOb-5 imposes liability only for nondisclosure of material facts.
The district court applied a test of materiality turning on whether "...
[t] he fact concealed or omitted influenced or should have influenced the
In the case of corporate officers, this statutory requirement is similar to the common
law fiduciary duty of such an officer to his corporation. However, the requirement of
rule 10b-5 has been extended beyond directors or management officers to include "anyone
in possession of material inside information." 401 F.2d at 848. The opinion reserved
judgment, however, on the question of whether "tippees" are included within the scope
of this language. 401 F.2d at 852-53.
18. See note 4 supra.
19. See text accompanying notes 53 to 56 infra. At least one scholar in the area
views this expansive attitude as a reflection of judicial impatience with statutory gaps
in protection and disapproval of restrictive procedural obstacles placed in the way of
recovery under other provisions of the SEA. BROMBERG 281. The propriety of the
judicial role in removing "procedural obstacles" which the legislature thought appropriate
is open to question on policy grounds.
20. The court specifically withheld consideration of the advisability of placing an
affirmative duty of disclosure on persons -who do not occupy a special relationship to a
seller or buyer of securities like that of insiders or broker-dealers. GAI at 97,541.
Thus the question of an affirmative duty of finders or sellers to disclose material
finder's fees remains to be resolved.
Although his concurring opinion is not unambiguous, Judge Kaufman would appear
to support an affirmative duty of disclosure by sellers and finders in the absence of
inquiry by the purchaser. Id. at 97,543. Judge Hays, on the other hand, clearly opts for a
broader "basis of liability" by placing an affirmative duty on the corporate officers to
inquire of the sellers as to the amount of the finder's fees and to report the same to the
SEC and the investing public. Id. He also would place an affirmative duty on the
finders to inform the purchasers of the amount of their fees, but curiously remains
silent as to any duty on the part of the sellers themselves to make disclosure. Id. at
97,544. This bifurcation of the duties of sellers and finders could have great significance,
particularly in a situation such as the instant case where a question exists whether
certain parties are really finders or owners (sellers). See note 7 supra.
It is also noteworthy in light of Judge Hays' employment of the term "liability"
that both Judge Friendly and Judge Kaufman expressly reserved comment on the
question of damages. Id. at 97,541 and 97,543.
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issuer in its decision to issue the stock in question, or would under the
circumstances influence a buyer in the market."21 The circuit court re-
jected this test and substituted the test of whether ". . . a reasonable man
would attach importance [to the fact in question] . . . in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question."2' 2
An understanding of the difference between the two tests requires
identification of the "fact in question" and the "transaction in question."
To determine the "transaction in question," the nature of the "fact in
question" must be clearly understood. The district court based its denial
of injunctive relief upon the failure of the SEC to establish that the
finder's fees were material in amount. The circuit court, however, did not
look at the finder's fees alone, but rather found a material fact in "the
variation of finder's fees from conventional norms."2 " One difference
between these approaches lies in the inferences which may be raised by
the fact which is required to be disclosed. By focusing on the variation
the circuit court required a disclosure which could serve as a reflection on
management's ability. The district court, however, would have required
disclosure of material amounts which may have no bearing on manage-
ment's ability so long as the amounts represent the normal fee in such
situations.
With this analysis of the "fact in question" the relevant "transaction
in question" is apparent. Although there were three types of transactions-
the agreement between the sellers and finders, 4 the contract between GAI
and the seller, and any transactions in the market place with respect to
GAI stock-it is the latter type which is germane. It is the effect of the
fact in question upon a reasonable investor which is decisive.2
In contrast, the district court's test looked not only to the effect of
the fact in question upon an investor but also to the effect upon the
issuer..2 6 This focus results in an application of the materiality test to a
21. SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 259 F. Supp. 99, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (emphasis
added).
22. GAI at 97,540. This test was adopted in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub. norn., List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965),
and was subsequently quoted with approval and applied in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
23. GAI at 97,540 (emphasis added).
24. See note 7 supra.
25. This conclusion is supported by the prior applications of the same test in
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), and Texas Gulf Sulphur.
In both cases the "transaction in question" was a purchase of stock by insiders who had
access to material information not known to those who sold the stock. In both cases the
"reasonable man" was an unassociated investor and the "choice of action" was whether
to enter the securities market either to buy or sell stock.
26. Judge Kaufman, in his concurring opinion, seems to adopt the same test in
stating that the finder-defendants failed to disclose a material fact since GAI might have
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second transaction-the acquisition of property. Although this transaction
gives rise to the duty of disclosure, under the test it is not the transaction
of foremost importance. In addition, the SEC argued that the district
court substituted a mixed subjective-objective test for the objective
reasonable man test of the second circuit and thereby required them to
establish reliance in addition to materiality." The circuit court did not
answer the allegation directly, but held that the seller's willingness to pay
two-thirds of the sale price to finders was a material variation from
conventional norms.2s
The disclosure requirements of rule lOb-5 extend only to transactions
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."29 This language
was recently construed in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co." as applying
to statements ". . . of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely
thereon, and, in connection therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase
or sell a corporation's securities.""'- Under such an interpretation, rule
lOb-5 can be violated in the absence of any associated securities transaction
whatsoever since it is the misleading statements which constitute the
violation.12 Thus, the only requirement would appear to be that the
representation be of a sort upon which reasonable investors might rely.
Using such an analysis there is no doubt that the misrepresentations
of the corporation and its officers were made in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities for the statements were made to
the investing public through press releases and 8-K reports. Such an
analysis may not, however, be applicable to the misrepresentations of the
sellers and finders, for their statements were not directed at the general
investing public but at the issuer or seller of the securities. Without
refused to consummate the transaction had it known of the proposed distribution of the
proceeds. GAI at 97,543.
27. Since the purpose of an action by the SEC is to enforce disclosure and not to
recover damages, the SEC need only show materiality and not reliance. Howvever, a
private party bringing an action for damages may have to show reliance as well. See
text accompanying notes 53 and 54 infra.
28. GAI at 97,540. The percentage referred to was based upon the initial contract
in the Nevada transaction which was never closed. The renegotiated contract provided
for only fifteen per cent of the consideration to go to the finders. See note 7 supra.
29. For the text of rule lob-5 see note 4 supra.
30. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
31. 401 F.2d at 860. This rule was approved and applied in Heit v. Weitzen, 402
F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968). "Purchase or sale" was construed by the Supreme Court to
include exchange of stock by shareholders pursuant to a corporate merger. SEC v.
National Sec., Inc., 89 S. Ct. 536 (1969). Indicating that ". . . the relevant definitional
sections of the 1934 Act are for the most part unhelpful. . . ," the Court derived a
functional definition; vi., whether the conduct involved ". . . is the type of fraudulent
behavior which was meant to be forbidden by the statute and the rule...." Id. at 572.
32. 401 F.2d at 860. See Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal
Securities Laws: The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L.
Rav. 872, 893-94 (1967).
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analyzing the result the circuit court held that since the sellers' and
finders' misrepresentations were made in connection with the purchase of
securities rule 10b-5 had been violated.33 The ramifications of such an
application of the rule cannot be fully appreciated without considering the
potential liability for nondisclosure.34
II. LIABILITY FOR NONDISCLOSURE
Although the circuit court expressly reserved comment on the
question of damages," it may have paved the way for private recovery in
future actions. 6 The expansion of the coverage of rule l0b-5 to date
serves as ample indication that the courts are not loath to provide private
remedies to effectuate the legislative purpose of the rule.37 This expansive
33. GAI at 97,540; contra. Jensen v. Voyles, 393 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1968). where
the court held in a private damage action that the seller's misrepresentation was not made
in connection with the purchase or sale of a corporation's stock within the meaning of
rule 10b-5 when the misrepresentations were made to a corporation which acquired the
seller's property in exchange for stock.
34. The three concurring judges in GAI were apparently concerned with the
implication of the majority's opinion and each indicated that the decision should he
limited to acquisitions involving the issuance of stock. GAI at 97,542; 97,543; 97,544. The
rationale advanced for the distinction was the "world of difference" between agreements
in which the finders are compensated in cash as compared to securities, since "only the
buyer and seller are affected" in a cash transaction. GAI at 97,543. This distinction
seems to be untenable since whatever depressant effect a material variation in finder's
fees would have on the market price of the company's stock should be the same in either
case. However, if the purchase of securities supplies the necessary link to rule 10b-5,
the effect would be to exclude the second type of representation from the scope of the
rule. This result need not follow, however, if the only necessary connection between the
statements and a purchase or sale of securities is that the statements become available to
the investing public.
35. GAI at 97,541.
36. Private parties may be desirous of private rights of action implied from the terms
of rule lob-5, notwithstanding the express provisions for civil liabilities contained in
other anti-fraud sections of the SA and the SEA (see note 2 supra) and the relief
available under state securities laws. This preference for action under rule lob-5 can be
explained by advantages of nation-wide jurisdiction, venue, and process (under sections
10 and 27 of the SEA and FED. R. Civ. P. 4) along with the relaxation of evidentiary
requirements and the elimination of some elements necessary for a cause of action in
common law fraud. See the text accompanying notes 52 to 55 infra.
37. The federal circuits have approved, either expressly or by implication, an
implied private right of action for violation of rule lob-5; e.g., Jordan Bldg. Corp. v.
Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968) ; Doelle v. Ireco Chem., 391 F.2d 6
(10th Cir. 1967) ; Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967) ; A. T.
Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781
(1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 879 (1965) ; Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) ; McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d
Cir. 1962) ; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Hooper v. Mountain States
Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) ; Beury v.
Beury, 222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955). For a discussion of the rationale underlying these
decisions, see BROMBERG 27-34; Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity
and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 430-33
(1968). The Supreme Court has not ho-wever, passed upon the existence of private
actions. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 89 S. Ct. 564, 572 n.9 (1969).
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attitude is, however, subject to judicial, administrative, and economic
limitations. The judicial limitation results from the necessity for adequate
standards by which a factual situation may be tested in the adjudicative
process; the administrative limitation reflects the need for an adequate
method of ensuring compliance with judicially developed standards; and
the economic limitation stems from the desirability of an orderly securities
market and resultant promotion of the nation's economic growth.
In considering the relation of these limitations to the disclosure rules
established in Great American Industries, a distinction should be made
between the three types of individual defendants which were involved-
corporate officers, sellers, and finders. This distinction was not clearly
drawn in the decision since the SEC contended that there was no difference
in the nature of the violations by the three types of defendants and the
court did not find it necessary to distinguish between the finders and the
sellers since their joint conduct constituted common law fraud." If, how-
ever, the disclosure rule is to be applied to situations in which common
law fraud is not present, or in which private compensatory remedies are
sought, failure to distinguish between the different types of defendants
may lead to unintended results.
The Judicial Limitation
The opinion fails to establish any criteria by which to judge the un-
usualness of finder's fees but relies upon the division as being unusual
upon its face. In transactions such as these where no "conventional norms"
exist,3" both sellers and finders may be unable to anticipate with any
degree of exactitude what a court will consider a "material deviation"
from this elusive "norm." Consequently, in order to ensure compliance
with the disclosure duty established by the principal case, future sellers
and finders, might have to disclose all finder's fees which they receive if
the information is requested. Corporate officers, on the other hand,
presumably have a certain expertise in these matters acquired in the
An implied private cause of action for violation of a statutory standard or conduct
is normally vested only in the class of persons whom the statute was intended to protect;
e.g., Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967); Taussig v.
Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963).
Sec W. PROSSER, TH3E LAW OF TORTS § 35 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 286 (1965). Thus the private cause of action implied from the provisions of rule
lob-5 has been limited to purchasers and sellers. E.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The SEC, however, has
taken the position that the class of persons Congress intended to protect under section
10(b) and rule lob-5 is not restricted to buyers and sellers. A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,
375 F.2d 393 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967). If this interpretation prevails then "an ever-increasing
circle of others" may indeed be permitted private recovery. See note 49 infra.
38. GAI at 97,325.
39. See note 7 supra.
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course of preparing reports pursuant to section 13 of the SEA mid thus
may be able to determine what fees should be disclosed. The result of
such a disclosure scheme is to give the party who can most advantage-
ously use the information in the negotiating process an effective means
of obtaining that information.
An additional problem arises when the lack of conventional norms
is coupled with the traditional reluctance of the courts to inquire into
discretionary business judgments in the absence of fraud.4" Since one of
the inferences arising from a material deviation in finder's fees from
conventional norms is management's inability, it could be argued that
the courts have embarked upon a course which could require them to
inquire into matters heretofore deemed inappropriate. Such a contention
fails to recognize that the courts can remain consistent with their prior
position, for the mechanics of the market, through the valuation process,
provides the proper forum to determine management's ability. Injunctive
proceedings do not impinge upon the business judgment rule but are
attempts to assure that the market will have accurate information upon
which to make its valuation.
The Administrative Limitation
The problem of enforcing the disclosure rule established by Great
American Industries may justify creation of an implied private right of
action under rule lOb-5. Although the SEA empowers the SEC to investi-
gate and publish violations of the SEA and to take appropriate legal
actions to enforce its provisions,41 the court in Great American Industries
noted that the SEC is already too overburdened to ".... have the time, the
resources or the material to enable it to police 8-K reports... " which are
filed directly with the SEC, as rapidly as is necessary to effectively
40. E.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261(1917) ; Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Heimann v. American
Express Co., 279 N.Y.S. 2d 867, 53 Misc. 2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 1967). There has been a
particular reluctance to inquire into the adequacy of consideration in a good-faith
transaction arrived at after arms-length negotiations between willing buyers and
sellers; e.g., Fielding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; Bayer v. Beran, 49
N.Y.S. 2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
41. See sections 21 and 32 of the SEA. Since adverse publicity is normally damaging
to a corporate defendant, the SEC is sometimes able to secure compliance with the
federal securities laws by an informal process of negotiations. Frequently these negotiated
settlements include restitution to defrauded private parties. See BROmBERG 237-39;
L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1824-29 (2d ed. 1961).
In addition, relief may be available to private parties ancillary to a proceeding
brought by the SEC. Precedent exists for such ancillary relief in other contexts; e.g.,
Mitchell v. De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act) ; Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) (action under the
Emergency Price Control Act). See generally Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction
Suits for Violation of Rule lOb-5, 79 HARV. L. REv. 656 (1966).
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prevent violations of rule 10b-5.4 A fortiori, the SEC must lack the time,
resources, and materials to roam the countryside searching out and
smiting tight-lipped sellers and finders with injunctive swords. Thus, the
same necessity for additional enforcement of federal securities laws in the
form of private rights of action which served as the basis for the Supreme
Court's decision in J. L Case v. Borak43-- the inability of the SEC to
determine the accuracy of all proxy materials submitted-may warrant
the creation of an implied private right of action for violation of rules
10b-5 and 13 a-1 1 in connection with the disclosure of finder's fees."
There seems to be no reason why the necessity rationale of Borak
should not apply with equal force to disclosure of finder's fees under rule
10b-5 In both instances, the congressional purpose is to provide
investors with adequate information upon which to base their actions by
requiring those who have access to information to disgorge it. With re-
spect to proxy solicitations and 8-K reports, the facilities of the SEC are
inadequate to handle the multitudinous instances deserving of investiga-
tion primarily because of the temporal factor involved. Thus supplemental
enforcement via private damage actions seems necessary to adequately
ensure compliance with the new judicial rule of disclosure of finder's
fees and clearly should be available under present judicial interpretation
of rule 10b-5. 6
The dimensions of the new relief available in a private right of action
for damages may be extensive in light of the Texas Gulf Sulphur deci-
42. GAI at 97,538. See Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv.
1340, 1362 (1966).
43. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
44. It seems settled that federal courts have the power to create such implied
private rights in order to effectuate the purposes underlying federal statutes (e.g.,
Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) (violation of section 22(a)
of the SA) ; Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961) (violation
of section 14 of the SEA); Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 229
F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (violation of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 993
(1938)). For the scope of such implied private remedies see note 41 supra. The Borak
decision indicates that the Supreme Court will do so in the context of the SEA. The
lower federal courts have clearly demonstrated their willingness to create such implied
rights under the provisions of the SEA. See note 41 supra.
However, this justification for the creation of an implied right of action in a private
party has been subject to some criticism on general policy grounds. See Comment,
Private Rights from Federal Statutes: Toward a Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L.
REv. 454, 464-66 (1968).
45. Accord, Shapo, Rule 10b-5 and Texas Gulf Sulphur: An Evaluation of
Questions and Answers, 20 U. MIAmI L. Rsv. 939, 954 (1966). Cf. SEC v. National
Sec., Inc., 89 S. Ct. 564, 572 n.9 (1969).
46. The addition of a private right of action not only increases the effectiveness
of enforcement of the present remedies, but also alters the existing balance between the
policies of deterrence and compensation. See Comment, Private Rights From Federal
Statutes: Toward a Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. Rv. 454, 466-69 (1968).
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sion." A concurring opinion in Great American Industries asserted that
the injury extends to "passive shareholders, potential purchasers, and an
ever-increasing circle of others."4 A right vested only in the purchasing
corporation would be insufficient to enforce such a duty of disclosure on
finders and sellers, since a seller, or a finder, cannot be compelled by a
purchaser to disclose information against his will prior to entering into a
consensual relationship.4" Although a contract subsequently entered into
would be voidable "' if the information had been requested and not given,
where the assets acquired were not overvalued and the corporation was
satisfied with the acquisition, as was apparently the case in Great
American Industries, to pursue this course would clearly not be in the best
interests of the corporation. In addition to rescission a corporation could
have an action for damages. However, since there has been no mis-
representation as to the value of the property received this action should
fail for a failure to show any resulting damage. A derivative action by
stockholders of the corporation would be similarly inappropriate for the
corporation has suffered no harm by acquiring an asset which was
correctly valued.51 A direct action by these shareholders against the pur-
47. See text accompanying notes 30 to 34 supra. But see Jensen v. Voyles, 393
F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1968) (misrepresentation by seller to corporate purchaser held not to
vest a cause of action in a shareholder of the purchasing corporation).
48. GAI at 97,543 (concurring opinion).
A "potential purchaser's" theory of recovery might be stated thus: If disclosure of
material finder's fees had been made, the market price would have declined (reflecting
investors' doubts concerning the true valuation of the property or management's
ability) and he would have purchased. However, since no disclosure was made, the
market price was unaffected or perhaps even rose (reflecting investors' surmises that the
property had been acquired at a bargain price by GAI). Therefore, he would be entitled
to the difference between the actual market price after full disclosure had been made and
what would have been the market price had full disclosure been made at the time he
contemplated purchase multiplied by the relevant number of shares. The impossibility of
proving such a conjectural claim should preclude recovery by a potential purchaser for
nondisclosure of material finder's fees alone.
Among those in the "ever-increasing circle of others" are holders of the securities
of other companies, perhaps the entire market, whose value is affected. Id. at 97,544
(concurring opinion). If these individuals are damaged by virtue of their status as
potential purchasers who failed to buy as a result of the misleading statements, then the
above reasoning would seem to apply with equal force. If, however, they are damaged by
a decline in value of the shares which they own in other companies because of a general
decline in the market or chaotic price fluctuations caused by the presence of incorrectly
valued shares in the market, then the above reasoning would not apply and
compensable damages may result. However, the evidentiary difficulty of establishing a
causal nexus between the violation of rule 10b-5 in connection with the securities of one
corporation and general adverse market conditions serves as an effective limitation upon
private actions based on this theory.
49. Since a finder or seller cannot force a corporate purchaser to make disclosure
to the SEC or to the public directly, a finder's or seller's duty should be limited to
making full disclosure to the corporate officials with whom they deal.
50. See section 29(b) of the SEA.
51. In the event that the asset was incorrectly valued, a derivative action would still
be inappropriate under rule 10b-5 since section 10(b) is ". . . directed solely at that
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chasing corporation would also fail because of the court's reluctance to in-
quire into business judgment.
A direct action by shareholders of the purchasing corporation
against the sellers and finders would be appropriate only in those
situations where the shareholder could demonstrate damage independent
of that of the corporation, i.e., in those situations where they had acted or
refrained from acting in any way which could be attributed to the
misrepresentations of the sellers and finders; otherwise their action would
be basically derivative. A common law action of this type would be
effectively delimited by the necessity of proving causation and reliance.
However, it is uncertain as yet which elements of common law
deceit need be shown in a private action seeking damages for violation of
rule 10b-5. The decisions are split as to the requirements of scienter and
privity, but the trend appears to be toward abandonment in private
actions.52 Although reliance appears to be necessary for a private action
under rule 10b-5, it is sometimes presumed from materiality" and has
become so intertwined with causation as to have become partially inter-
changeable with that requirement.54 Causation in some form seems to
be required, but the nature of the test and the proximity required have not
received sufficient judicial attention to warrant any generality.5
The Economic Limitation
It is difficult to predict the economic effect of the disclosure duty
established by Great American Industries." The benefits to the securities
type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or
purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs.. .."
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952), quoted with approval in GAI at 97,555 (dissenting opinion). See Hoover v.
Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) for a collection of cases. See also
Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of
the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1274, 1293 n.112 (1965).
52. Compare SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968);
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967) ; Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th
Cir. 1965) ; Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307
F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); with Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y
1965). See generally Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices:
The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1293
(1965) ; Comment, Civil Liability Under Section ioB and Rule ioB-5, 74 YALE L.J. 658
(1965).
53. E.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965).
54. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 341 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub. noin.,
List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
55. Compare SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) with
Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 347 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970(1967) ; and Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del.
1965).
56. The direct practical impact of the economic constraint may be illustrated by
the current activity in the District Court for the Southern District of New York follow-
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market resulting from the disclosure policy underlying rule 10b-5 must
be examined in light of the effect which such disclosure may have on the
operation of the economy upon which the securities market depends. In
view of the frequent involvement of finders in a wide range of financing
transactions, and the broad construction of the phrase "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security" in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the duty to
disclose finder's fees could arise in innumerable situations."
In assessing the disclosure duty it is important to distinguish between
disclosures by finders and sellers to corporate officers and ultimate dis-
closure by the latter. Since neither group is normally in a position to
enforce disclosure by the other group, the source of the necessary com-
pulsion must be in either the SEC or the public via private damage
actions. The economic effect of the duty to disclose finder's fees will vary
according to the method of enforcement chosen and the group to which
enforcement is applied."
It may be desirable for future courts which pass upon the question
of disclosure of finder's fees to reassess the desirability of disclosing
finder's fees which are not clearly material, for example, those which are
not material under some standard analogous to that provided in section 13
relating to transactions involving a "significant amount of assets.""0 This
judicial reexamination of the disclosure duty is appropriate because there
ing the decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). At the
time the district court decision was handed down, there were at least forty-nine pending
private actions for damages totaling in excess of 2,800,000 dollars for compensatory
damages and 77,000,000 dollars for punitive damages. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
258 F. Supp. 262, 267 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Since the circuit court decision, the number
of private actions has grown to about 100. The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 19, 1969, at 6,
col. 1. See generally Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State
of Mind it Ride iob-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423, 429 (1968).
57. Those sellers who are subject to the SEA must file an 8-K report with the
SEC if the assets sold constitute a "significant amount of assets." See note 5 supra.
These partial disclosures required by rule 13a-11 would render subsequent failure to
disclose material finder's fees a violation of rule lOb-5. Those sellers who are not subject
to the disclosure provisions of the SEA and who did not disclose material finder's
fees could escape violation only if they made no prior statements as to the consideration
involved. However, even a statement in the sales contract that the sellers will receive
all the consideration would seem to suffice to bring rule lob-5 to bear.
58. The distinction between finders and sellers on one hand, and corporate officers
on the other, serves as the basis and the justification for the following suggested
disclosure scheme. Finders and sellers, upon inquiry, could be required to disclose to
the corporate officers with whom they deal any finder's fees which the finders and
sellers deem material. If such disclosure is adequate and accurate, any future legal
action by the corporation, the SEC, or members of the investing public against the
finders or sellers should be precluded. The corporate purchaser would then be required
to disclose to the SEC those finder's fees which the corporate officers, in the exercise
of their past experience and best judgment, believe material. Adoption of this scheme
should serve to minimize the adverse economic effects of disclosure without unduly
compromising the flow of adequate market information to the investing public.
59. See note 5 supra.
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are frequently legitimate reasons why those selling property to a corpora-
tion may not wish to divulge the ultimate division of the proceeds. Sellers
might forgo many transactions which would have been advantageous to
the corporate purchaser rather than disclose the amount of finder's fees
involved. Further, the percentage of the proceeds allocated to finder's
fees is an unreliable indicator of the correct value of property acquired
by a corporation since the division of the purchase price necessarily
reflects extraneous factors such as the financial positions, bargaining skills,
and personal relationships of the parties.6" Disclosure of the amount of
finder's fees alone may be misleading to a reasonable investor unaware of
such factors and adverse market reactions may result. If such reactions
become common, finder's fees may be forced below the level necessary to
adequately encourage and reward finders in their performance of a valua-
able economic function. This effect would be magnified if private damage
actions are permitted in circumstances where undisclosed amounts are
numerically insignificant. 6' On the other hand, it may be argued that
disclosure proceedings by the SEC are both desirable and consistent with
the purpose of rule 10b-5 since such proceedings ensure that the market
is afforded an opportunity to express investors' opinions that certain
finder's fees have varied excessively from established norms.
CONCLUSION
As has already been suggested, finders might avoid the new dis-
closure provisions in Great American Industries by merely absenting
themselves from the negotiations.62 Since purchasers can avoid imposing
a duty to disclose material finder's fees upon sellers by remaining silent
as to such fees, and sellers can avoid imposing the same duty on purchasers
by failing to question the purchasers as to such fees, then in those in-
stances where each party considers the proposed transaction to be desir-
able their course of conduct to avoid liability becomes clear-silence.
The desirability of this result would seem to be, at best, debatable. How-
ever, if the finder's fees involved are justified under the circumstances,
the parties should not be overly hesitant to disclose them so long as
private parties must express their disapproval through the market mech-
anism rather than through the judicial system. Therefore, the policy of
disclosure underlying rule 10b-5 is best served not by allowing private
damage actions, but rather by increasing the effectiveness of administra-
tive enforcement procedures.
60. Brief for Appellee Frederick J. Pagnani at 13, SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc.,
-F.2d-(2d Cir. 1968).
61. See the text accompanying notes 40 and 41 supra.
62. See note 7 supra. Finders may run an additional juridical risk of being
classified as sellers regardless of pre-existing contractual arrangements to the contrary.
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Thus, if the decision in Great American Industries is read as simply
imposing a duty on finders and sellers to respond to direct questions by
purchasers concerning finder's fees and requiring purchasers to disclose
to the SEC those finder's fees ". . . which in reasonable and objective
contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securi-
ties. . . " then it represents a logical outgrowth of the Texoas Gulf
Sulphur decision. If, however, the variation standard used by the court
is strictly applied, and the duty of disclosure is enforced by allowing
private damage actions, then extensive liability may be imposed for the
failure to disclose comparatively small finder's fees.
David L. Cocanower
